PARKER v. SIEBERN.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Superior Court of Cincinnati.
ISAAC W. PARKER ET AL. v. STEPHEN W. SIEBERN, AUDITOR.
AND OLIVER W. NIXON, TREASURER OF HAMILTON COUNTY.
JAMES A. FRAZIER ET AL. v. THE SAME.
Tax upon the Owners of Shares of National Banks.-There is no valid objection
to a state tax upon the owners of shares of stock in national banks, in common
with other property in the state. And in estimating the value of such shares for
purposes of taxation under state laws, it is not requisite to deduct that portion of
the capital or property of such banks which is invested in United States stocks.
The tax in such cases is an assessment upon the person of the owner, with regard
to property, and in no sense a tax upon the bank or its capital.

THE petitions in these cases were filed in the Superior Court
of Cincinnati in December 1865, stating that plaintiffs on and
before 10th April 1865 were an association for carrying on the
business of banking, under an Act of Congress, approved June 3d
1864, entitled "An act to provide a national currency, secured
by a pledge of United States bonds, and to provide for the circu-.
lation and redemption thereof," and had complied with all the
requisitions of said act, and were entitled to all benefits and privileges
which it secured. That the first-named association, with a capital
of $304,000 paid in, divided into five thousand shares, had
invested, according to the provisions of said Act of Congress,
$299,150 in bonds and securities of the United States, exempt
from state taxation, and that its other personal property did not
exceed $60,000.
That the other association with a capital of $1,000,000, divided into ten thousand shares, had invested, according to the
provisions of said Act of Congress, in bonds and securities of the
United States, exempt from state taxation, of its capital the sum
of $600,000, and otherwise in the course of business the sum
of $1,439,050, and that the residue of its personal property,
which might be subject to taxation under state authority, did not
exceed $300,000. That the auditor of Hamilton county had
assessed each shareholder in said associations, upon the duplicate
of said county for taxation, the amount of his shares at their par
value, without reference to the property of the association, which
they claim that the shares represent. That the treasurer of Hamilton
county is about to collect the tax assessed on said shares, viz.,
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2 29-100 per cent. on the amounts thereof. That neither the
Act of the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, passed 5th
April 1859, entitled "An act for the assessment and taxation of
property in this state, and for levying taxes thereon, according to
its true value in money," nor the act amendatory thereto, passed
8th April 1865, under which said assessments are made, nor any
act of the General Assembly of Ohio, did or could give authority
to make said assessments or collect the same.
They claim to be allowed an exemption upon their shares in
proportion thereof, to the bonds and securities of the United States
held by the associations, instead of said shares being taxed at
their par value, irrespective of the bonds and securities of the
United States held by the associations.
They clainl that the shares of banks organized under the
authority of the state of Ohio are not taxed or required to be
listed for taxation, and that individuals engaged in the business
of banking, other than issuing notes for circulation, and otherwise employing moneyed capital, in listing their property for
taxation, claim and are allowed an exemption as to the bonds and
securities of the United States held by them, and that, therefore,
the assessment on their shares will operate as an assessment of
taxes under state authority, at a greater rate than is assessed
upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens
of the state of Ohio.
They pray for an injunction against the county auditor and
county treasurer to restrain them from assessing or collecting
said taxes. To which petitions the defendants demurred.
The cases were, at the January Term 1866, reserved to the
court in General Term, for the opinion of all the judges upon the
questions arising upon the demurrer.
Aaron F. Perryand William T. Cholson, for plaintiffs.
Wkn. T. Scarborough, Joshua Hf. Bates, and aeorge Hoadly,
for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STORER, J.-The questions presented by the pleadings lie within
a narrow compass. There need be no discussion of merely constitutional powers, for every point that would seem by possibility to
be involved, has not only been settled by the highest judicial
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authority, but whether applied to the General Government or
individual states, must be' a necessary incident of sovereignty.
We may dismiss, therefore, any argument to sustain the right to
impose a tax, as well as to forbid the imposition.
However there may be a disposition at the present day with
some tribunals, to announce ex cathedrawhat has been so long
and so willingly approved by the profession, as if the foundations
of our organic law had not yet been profoundly explored, and in
the effort to enlighten, pages of mere axioms are read from the
bench, we cannot perceive that the conclusions to which MARSHALL arrived, more than forty years ago, are made clearer or
more consistent with sound reason by any modern jurist. We
are content to follow so pure and just a man laud passibus ceuis.
Assuming, then, that all bonds and other securities issued by
the General Government are not the subject of state taxation,
our inquiry is reduced to a single point: Can the shares of individual banks be taxed ?
The power to tax is given in express terms by the forty-first
section of the act to provide a national currency ; but the same
power would exist if the provision referred to had not been
embodied in the act.
In all discussions where the taxing power of the state has
been questioned, we find no claim asserted that the shares of individuals in the United States Bank were protected, because the
capital and the business of that institution could not be assessed
for state purposes. Judge MARSHALL, in Mcullough v. The
State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 436, in announcing the unanimous
opinion of the court declaring the law of Maryland imposing a tax
on the bank to be unconstitutional and void, says, "This
opinion does not deprive the states of any resources which they
originally possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid by the
real property of the bank in common with the other real property
within the states, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the
citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in common with
other property of the same description throughout the state."
And Mr. Pinckney, the leading counsel for the bank, in his
closing argument, admitted, "That the stock in the bank belonging to citizens of Maryland still continued liable to state taxation,
as a portion of the individual property in common with all the
other p.,perty of the state. The establishment of the bank, so
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far from withdrawing anything from state taxation, brings some
thing into it which the state may tax."
An examination of the cases in which the Supreme Court of
the United States has from time to time considered these questions, will furnish no authority against the position which was
maintained in the Court of South Carolina in Bulow and Others
v. The City Council of 0harleston, 1 Nott & McCord 527, and
in Berry and Others v. The Tax Collectors, 2 Bailey 634. No
appeal seems to have been taken by the bank to the ruling which
imposed a tax upon the shareholders; but, on the contrary, the
action of the state authority was not only submitted to, but
virtually sustained by the acquiescence of those immediately
interested.
There can be no doubt, from the law organizing national banks,
as well as from various decisions upon questions analogous to the
present, that a tax may be levied upon the shares held by individual shareholders.
But how the tax.shall be assessed, and in what manner collected,
presents another subject for consideration.
It cannot be doubted that the tax upon banking institutions must
be equal, so far as it respects the percentage levied. No distinction can be permitted, or favor shown, to the domestic over
the foreign corporation. This we consider to be the true exposition of the second section of the twelfth article of the Constitution
of Ohio, which declares "that laws shall be passed taxing by a
uniform rate all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, bank stock,
joint stock companies, or otherwise," and our Supreme Court, in
City of Zanesille v. Bichards, 5 Ohio St. 589, decided that this
provision "requires a uniform rate per cent. to be levied upon all
property according to its true value in money."
The tax must not only be uniform, but assessed alike upon the
same property, whether owned by residents or non-residents.
It is admitted that the county auditor, in May last, having
applied to the proper officers of the bank, obtained the names of
the shareholders in these institutions, and the number of shares
owned by each; that each share was assessed at its nominal value
and placed on the grand levy for taxation.
This, it is claimed, was done under the fourth section of the
amendatory law of April 6th 1865, which requires " all shares
VOL. X=r.-
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of stock in any national bank located within the state, whether
held or owned by residents or non-residents, should be listed for
taxation, and taxed in the city or county inwhich the bank is
located."
This would seem to be in harmony with the power already
given by the forty-first section of the act establishing the national
banks; indeed, it is in strict conformity, unless the assessment is
invalid upon other grounds.
It is not pretended that the per centum of tax levied is greater
than that paid by other moneyed institutions in the state; but it
would seem rather, if any discrimination existed, it was largely
in favor of national banks. Thus the state institutions are
assessed upon their capital stock, undivided profits, and all other
means not forming part of their capital; while the national banks
are not taxed as such, but the shares of individuals only, irrespeo
tive of all profits earned, are assessed. No authority is assumed
by the state to tax the capital of these institutions, as it is composed altogether of United States bonds, which are exempted
by law.
It is said by counsel, if the shares in the state banks are not taxed,
there is no propriety in taxing the shares in the -national banks.
This supposed incongruity is readily explained when we are assured
the tax imposed on the stockholders of the latter institution is not
equal to that which is borne by those who hold shares 'in the
former, and, therefore, there is no inequality in the burden. The
apparent difference is in the mode. Besides, it is not true that
the assessment of this tax can only be made when similar property,
by the same designation, is subjected to taxation held by individuals in state institutions. No such condition is 'required by
the statute, and we cannot see that any sound reason exists to
forbid the levy.
An ingenious, but as we apprehend, an erroneous view has
been presented in the argument, which, if sustained, would
virtually place the shares of stock and the capital within the
protection of the law which withholds the latter from taxation.
It assumes that the stock originally subscribed and the original
interests of the shareholders are identical; that the value of the
shares depends upon the full enjoyment of all the privileges
attached to the national banks by their organization, and the
power, therefore, to impose a burden upon the owner of shares
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must necessarily affect-the corporation itself, lessen the immunity
it claims to possess, and thus indirectly assess the capital.
It is argued further that this right to tax, if admitted, would
lead to oppression, as it will be discretionary with the state how
far it shall extend, and if allowed would endanger if not destroy
the franchise.
These objections cannot, we are satisfied, be sustained by the
facts before us, nor can we fairly anticipate any ground of future
difficulty. We are not to believe the legislature will act a dishonorable part in so important a matter, where the interests of
the state are immediately involved, or disobey a provision of the
constitution which prohibits the imagined wrong. This argument
at best is 1 ab inconvenienti," and can only be resorted to when
all others have failed. We must never presume power not delegated will be usurped; if it should be, the judiciary.would at
once restrain the assumption.
But the shares in these national institutions are not a part of
the capital. A deposit is made with the treasury department in
United States bbnds, to the amount of the stock subscribed, and
bills representing currency are issued to the bank. It is on this
circulating medium thus received, as well as on their deposits,
discounted notes and bills, that the profits of the shares acciue.
It is then but the levy of a percentage upon the means which
produce these profits that is claimed by the state.
If, however, they are freed from the general burden on the
hypothesis urged by counsel, an individual has but to invest his
whole estate, however large, in these institutions, while the
government, which immediately protects his property, and allows
him to vindicate his rights in her tribunals, can derive no benefit
from his estate; in reality he will bear no part of the public
burdens.
Nor do we think the objection that the shares are not assessed
at their real value can be sustained, as the auditor has placed
them upon the duplicate, at the sum they stand credited on the
books of the bank, as prescribed by the 12th section of the act
which gave these institutions their corporate existence. Such a
construction of the statute would necessarily confer very exten
sive power, and lead to great uncertainty in the mode of taxation,
besides furnishing a standard to determine values in these days
of stock gambling, not by any fixed rate, but rather by the
caprice of speculators.
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It is not alleged that the shares are valued too high, and we
presume it could not with any truth be so affirmed, nor are any
data assumed by which a more accurate and impartial assessment
could be made. True it is, several theories are suggested by
which supposed injustice might be avoided, but we must view the
questions before us in their practical applications; we ought not
even to imagine wrong to exist until the facts proved in the case
will necessarily lead to such a conclusion.
As taxation is an essential attribute of sovereignty, all property is liable to be assessed for public purposes. If any exception exists, the reservation from the general burden is jealously
guarded. There can be no implication where the exception is
required to be expressly made.
The proposition that the shares in these banks are so identified
with their capital that they in reality represent it, has been fully
considered in the case of The City of Utica v. ChurchilIl and
others, decided a short time since by the Supreme Court of New
York, and which was affirmed on error by the Supreme Court of
the United States at their late session, that we do not feel
required to discuss the question anew. We fully accord with the
opinion of the majority of the court in the latter case, and that

of Judge

SELDEN

in the former.

In thus deciaing, we are satisfied we do nothing to impair the
authority of the General Government, or lessen, in the least
degree, our solemn obligation as a judicial tribunal to uphold the
law, while we sustain in its full integrity our national credit.
Our first duty, we admit, is to preserve the Union, but we must
not, in our devotion to the national unity, forget that it is composed of individual states.
The foregoing opinion of Ir. Justice in possession.

This is, indeed, no rea-

STORER is upon a subject of very great son why it should not be exempted, if
interest to the several states, since ex- the fair construction of the National
empting all the bank stock in the country Constitution requires it. But it affords
from all state taxation, even as a source good cause for careful consideration beuf incc me, in common with other sources fore taking a step so essentially limiting

of income, in addition to all National
stocks, will reduce the range of state
taxation; in many districts, within very
narrow limits. It will extend scarcely
beyond the land and goods and chattels

the range of state taxation.
The case, so far as any impediment
to levying the tax arises from the
conflict between National and state
sovereignty, must turn upon the same
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.lnestions as that of Bank of Commerce v.
New York City, 2 Black 620, and the
case of Bank Tax, 2 Wallace U. S. 200.
And the only earlier cases, in the Supreme Court of the United States, bearing directly upon the same question, are
McCullough v. State of Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, and Weston v. The City
Council of Charleston, 2 Peters 449.
The case of Osborne v. The Bank of
the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, being
regarded as almost identical with IeCullough v. State of Maryland.
It is scarcely necessary to say that as
the powers and functions of the National
Government have become very much
extended since those early decisions in
regard to taxation were made, it is but
natural, perhaps, that the constructions
and decisions of the Supreme Court
should have correspondingly changed.
At the time of the discussion of the
case of MfCullough v. Maryland, at the
February Term 1819, after argument
by the ablest counsel, perhaps, which
the republic has ever produced, Mr.
Webster, Mr. Wirt, and Mr. Pinckney,
for the United States; and Mr. Hopkinson, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Martin, for the
State of Maryland; and, after mature
consideration by the court of last resort,
embracing among its members many of
the ablest and wisest judges who have
ever adorned any judicial tribunal ; men
cotemporary with and sustaining the
most intimate relations toward the
framers of the National Constitution,
and within comparatively a few years
of its adoption ; under these favoring
accidents for obtaining thorough and
correct views of its import and fair
construction, no pretence was put forth,
even by way of argument or illustration,
verging in the remotest degree towards
the exemption of the sharcowners of the
bank from liability to state taxation.
But it was expressly conceded in the
argument and assumed by the court, in

giving their opinion and judgment, that
this exemption did "not extend to a tax
paid by the realproperty of the bank, in
common with other real propertywithin the
state, nor to a tax imposed on the interest
which the citizens of Mfaryland may hold
in this institution, in common with other
property of the same description throughout the state." The tax there held invalid was a stamp-tax imposed upon the
issues of the bank, amounting to one
per cent. upon its entire circulation,
unless the bank should pay fifteen
thousand dollars annually, in advance,
to the treasurer of the state, as a bonus
or royalty upon the privilege of exercising banking powers within the state.
Chief Justice MARSHALL, in conclusion,
puts the decision expressly and exclusively upon the ground that "this is a
tax on the operationsof the bank, and
is, consequently, on the operation of an
instrument employed by the Government
of the Union to carry its powers into
execution."
And in Osborne v. The Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, where the
whole ground is again reviewed by the
court, the question arose upon an assessmeat made directly upon the bank, and
which the treasurer of the State of Ohio
was proceeding to collect, by distress,
upon the deposits in the bank, and the
court declare that "the bank is not considered as a private corporation, whose
principal object is trade and individual
profit, but as a public corporation, created
for public and national purposes." "The
whole opinion of the court in the case of
McCulloughv. The State of Maryland,"
said the learned judge, "is founded on
and sustained by the idea that the bank
is an instrument which is necessary and
proper for carrying into effect the powers
vested in the Government of the United
States." The entire argument of this
distinguished luminary of American
constitutional law, in this ease and that
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of McCullough v. Maryland, extending the states, so as, in effect, to extinguish
over more than fifty pages, upon all the the action of that government, if allowed.
questions involved, is made to turn exBut now that the results of national
clusively upon the idea of the distinction development have shown the convebetween a specific tax upon the bank nience of multiplying national governitself and its operations and a general mental functions, the same court hold,
one upon its property or shares in com- that no citizen or state corporation,
mon with other similar property in the within any of the states, can be taxed
state ; the former being susceptible of for income derived from any of the
being so extended and enlarged, if its instruments of the National Governvalidity is maintained, as to annihilate ment, and especially from its public
the bank as one of the indispensable stocks. It seems to us that this principle,
instrumnents of the National Government.
carried to its legitimate results, will renAnd this point is perhaps still more der state taxation very unequal, and that
distinctly brought out in the discussions it is not in any just sense required by
upon the case of Weston v. The City the necessities of the National GovernCouncil of Charleston, 2 Peters 449, ment. The court in the case of Bank
both in the state court and the national of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black
tribunal of last resort. Judge HUGER, 620, where this principle is first estabof the Constitutional Court of South lished, seem to place the decision mainly
Carolina, who, with two other judges, upon the ground that it will be impracdissented from the decision of the state ticable for the national courts to protec:
court maintaining the tax, in a very able the instruments of the National Governopinion, maintains *that the tax in that ment from destructive taxation unless
case is a tax eo nomine, and specifically they go the whole length of declaring
upon the United States stocks. And the United States stock exempt from the juriscase is placed by Chief Justice MAn- diction of the states, as a source of taxaSHALL and the majority of the national tion, either directly or indirectly ; that
court upon the same ground ; while the if the owners of the stock are allowed
dissenting opinion ofMr. Justice TuomP- to be taxed for the income derived from
sox, in that court, is put upon the ground it, the same evil consequences, except
that the tax in that case was really in a less degree, will follow, as if the
nothing more than a tax upon the tax were imposed upon the stock itself.
owner of the stock, on account of the This conjectural result seems to us
income derivable from it. This shows merely imaginary, and, like all arguhow well agreed the different members ments ab inconrnienti, more specious
of the court at that time were upon the than sound.
principles upon which the cases, up to
There is no principle better established
that time, had proceeded. There was than that a state may tax its inhabitants
not at that time, supposed to be any for income derived from the stocks of
objection to a state tax upon income, foreign corporations, or the public stocks
because it was derived from a loan to of other states or countries. And this
the-National Government, provided this power of taxation exists wholly indeincome were taxed only in common with pendent of any jurisdiction over the corincome from other sources. But the porations or the stock itself. It is a
objection to a specific tax upon any of merely personal tax, like a poll-tax.
the instruments of the National Govern- There is no limit to the right of personal
ment was, in its very nature, susceptible taxation. It may be made to depend upon
of an indefinite increase at the will of a thousand incidents almost; upon occu-
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pation, or age, or property: and, in the
latter case, it is wholly unimportant
whether the property, so far as personalty
is concerned, is within the jurisdiction
of the state or not. Personal property
is a mere incident of the person. It has
always seemed to us, therefore, that the
state shoald not be restricted in imposing an income tax upon its inhabitants,
so as not to embrace income derived
from loans to the National Government,
as well as from all other sources. It
has always appeared to us that any such
restriction was an entire departure from
the first principles upon which the exemption from taxation of certain instruments of the National Government were
based, and at the same time the adoption
of a principle of exemption from taxation
which, while it resulted from extreme
over-caution on the one hand, evinced a
kind of disregard to the consequent
embarrassments produced upon the other
hand, which exhibited a degree of onesidedness in the action of the national
tribunal of last resort in painful contrast
with the cautious and delicate circumspection exhibited by the court in its
earlier discriminations in favor of exclusive national sovereignty and of the
consequent curtailment of the sovereignty of the states, which it is the
more alarming to perceive just at a time
when the harmonious action of the state
and national governments is liable at
any moment to be irretrievably disturbed.
But we understand also, and rejoice to
remember, that all this apprehension on
our part may proceed from wrong bias
or want of full comprehension of the
difficulties and dangers lurking under
the form of taxation by way of income.
To us it seems very certain that no
danger could come from that mode of
state taxation, and that the denial of it
will be more likely to produce a revolution in the very framework of the government, than any other principle yet

sanctioned by that court. We have felt
the more disappointment at the advance
of that tribunal in that direction, from
the entire confidence which we feel in its
wisdom and purity, and from our extreme
gratification at some of its other recent
decisions, which evinced such an abiding
firmness and far-seeing comprehension
in the discovery and maintenance of the
just principles of liberty and justice.
We have presented the foregoing views
in order to justify the suggestion that as
these national banking associations are
allowed to be formed, as part of the
scheme "to provide a national currency,
and for the circulation and redemption
thereof," as among the agencies and
instruments "necessary and proper for
carrying into effect the powers vested in
the government of the United States" by
the Constitution; and as, according to
the argument of the court upon that
point in _1fc Cullough v. Maryland,supra,
they could only be justified upon that
ground, we do not well comprehend
why it may not be as consistent, to exempt the owners of shares in such banks
from all state taxation, on the ground
of income derived therefrom, as in the
case of the former United States Bank,
or of the public stocks of the nation.
But for the decisions in the more recent
cases in the Supreme Court, already
.alluded to, we should have supposed the
decision in the principal case most unquestionable; and we still trust the Supreme Court will find some good way to
distinguish this case from that of Bank
of Commerce v. New York City, supra,
which does not readily occur to us, short
of ruling these national banks "unnecessary" for governmental purposes,
and, by consequence, unconstitutional :
or if they cannot find any good way of
escape in this direction, that they may
be induced to retrace their steps towards
the old foundations.
I. F. R.

SEISS v. STORCH.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
WILLIAM H. SEISS v. HENRY STORCH.
Where a party is called by the other side as a witness on the trial of a case the
objection to his competency is removed for all purposes, and he may be called at a
subsequent period in the same trial as a witness in his own behalf.

ERROR to Common Pleas of Lehigh county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
READ, J.-The defendant called the plaintiff, and he was
examined and cross-examined. The plaintiff's counsel then called
the plaintiff as a witness on his own behalf; he was objected to,
but was admitted to testify, and was examined and cross-examined,
and this is assigned for error.
In England, when called as a witness by the defendants, he
mi-ht, on cross-examination, have testified as to every and any
fact material to the issue, but in Pennsylvania, according to the
rule in Blmaker v. Buckley, 16 S. & R. 72, a party cannot,
before he has opened his case, introduce it to the jury by crossexamining the witness of the adverse party. Accordingly, in
Floyd v. Bovard, 6 W. & S. 75, the plaintiff called as a witness
a co-defendant, and examined him, and at a subsequent stage of the
trial he was called and examined as a witness for the defendant.
In this case the witness was both a party and directly interested.
C. J. GIBSON said, p. 77, "The plaintiff himself had called him
to prove a part of his case, the witness consenting to be sworn;
and had not this been done, he certainly would have been incompetent to testify for his co-defendant; and why? because his
interest raised a presumption unfavorable to his credibility, which
would not have been rebutted. But did not the plaintiff rebut it
when he produced him as a witness worthy of credit and had the
benefit of his testimony ?-or did he assert no more than that he
was worthy of credit only when he testified against his own
interest? The -man who is honest enough to declare the whole
truth when it makes against him, will be honest enough to declare
no more than the truth in his own favor. It would give a party
an unjust advantage to let him pick out particular parts of a witness's testimony and reject the rest. But the matter does not
rest on principle alone, for it is a familiar rule that a party can-
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not discredit his own witness or show his incompetency :" see also
Stockton & Stokes v. Demuth, 7 Watts 41, per SERGEANT, J.,
and Turner v. Waterson, 4 Watts & S. 175, by the same learned
judge, where the same doctrine is directly laid down.
In construing, therefore, the remedial Act of 27th March 1865,
P. L. 88, we must apply this well-established principle, that if a
party puts an incompetent witness on the stand by exercising any
power which he possesses over him, he makes him an entirely competent witness in the cause, to be used as such by either party.
The learned judge was entirely right, and
The judgment is affirmed.

S _reme Court of Nfew Jersey.
RIPLEY v. NEW JERSEY RAILROAD COMPANY.
Where a railroad company has issued a commutation ticket, by which the purchaser is entitled to ride for less than the usual legal fare, and the ticket contains a
contract that the commuter shall show it to the conductor when requested, the com-

pany is entitled to enforce such contract strictly, and the loss of the ticket will
deprive the commuter of his right to a free passage on the cars.

ON demurrer to the declaration,
The opinion of the court was delivered by
VREDENBURGH, J.-The declaration states that the defendants,
on the 6th of January, 1865, in consideration of $80 paid them,
granted to the plaintiff the privilege of a free passage. on their
road from New Brunswick to New York, daily for one year, and
at the same time gave him a commutation ticket showing such
right, and also at the same time a receipt for the money, which
receipt also provides that the ticket is to be shown to the conductor each trip whenever required, and that the privilege is
to be forfeited upon any infringement of this rule, and that no
duplicate ticket would be issued.
The declaration then further avers, that in October the plaintiff had his ticket stolen from him, and that the defendants,
because he could not show his ticket, refused him the said privilege of a free pass; whereupon he brought this suit for damages.
This is noz a question of the reasonableness of the rules of the
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company, or whether the plaintiff complied with such rules, or
whether it was reasonable or lawful for the company to establish
rules that their conductors should see and examine the tickets of the
passengers; but simply whether it was lawful for the parties so
to contract, and whether they did so contract.
It is not suggested that the parties might not lawfully make
such a contract, and it is apparent upon the express terms of the
instrument that they did so contract.
It is argued that the ticket being lost, the plaintiff should be
permitted to prove its contents, as in the case of other lost instruments. But nobody objected to that, that is not the difficulty;
the difficulty is, that upon proving the contents it appears that
by the terms of the instrument the plaintiff has lost the privilege
of a free pass.
The right to a free pass depended by the terms of his contract
upon his showing the conductor his ticket, and this he could not
do for he had lost it.
It has been argued that the plaintiff had paid his fare, and
that he ought not to lose his right because he has lost the evidence of the payment. If there had been no special contract, or
if the plaintiff had paid all the fare that the law allows the
defendants to charge, that would have been another question.
But he paid here a special fare under a special contract.
The defendants agreed that the plaintiff might travel for a fare
which is not alleged to be the full fare the law allowed, and the
defendants had a right to enforce such conditions as they saw fit,
and they saw fit to prescribe, as a condition, that the plaintiff
should show his ticket, and this he agreed to.
He thus became his own insurer that he would not lose his
ticket. If he did not like that contract he should not have
entered into it. But having entered into it, he is bound by it as
much so as the company are to carry him if he does show his
ticket.
We are not concerned with what may have been the reasons the
company had for inserting this condition in the contract. It is
enough for us that they have done so.
The demurrer is well taken.

DEARDORFF v. FORESMAN.
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Principaland Surety.-If a surety signs and delivers to his principal an instrument perfect upon its face, with a condition that it shall not be delivered to the
obligee, payee, or grantee, until some other persons who are agreed upon shall also
execute the same, and the principal delivers the instrument without regard to the
condition, and the obligee, payee, or grantee has no knowledge of the condition,
the delivery will bind the surety. Saine.-PromissoryNote.-A. executed his promissory note, payable to the order
of B., and induced C. and D. to sign the note as sureties, and redeliver it to him,
A., upon the promise that he would procure other persons, named by them, also to
execute said note. In disregard of his promise, A. delivered the note to B. without procuring the additional sureties agreed upon.
Hdd, that the delivery to B. was absolute, and that the sureties were liable, without regard to the condition.

APPEAL

from the Tippecanoe Common Pleas.

H. W. Chase and J. A. Wilstah, for appellants, cited Pepper
v. The State, 22 Ind. 399; Awde v. Dixon, 6 Exch. 869; Leaf
v. Gibbs, 4 C. & P. 466.; Johnson v. Baker, 4 B. &ei. 440;
The State v. Bodly, 7 Blk. 355.
John Pettit,for appellee, cited Millett v. Parker,2 Met. (Ky.)
608; 1 Bouv. Inst. 845 ;. 2 Id. 896.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RAY, J.-Action by the appellee, upon a promissory note,
against Deeds, Deardorff & Lehman. Deeds suffered a default.
The other defendants answered in two paragraphs. First, that at
the date of the note in suit, Deeds, who was insolvent, applied to
them to execute the note with him, as his sureties, to the plaintiff,
which they refused to do; that he fraudulently represented to
them that if they would sign the -note, he could procure as
co-sureties with them eleven other responsible men, who are named,
and that he would not deliver the note to the plaintiff until such
signatures were procured. That he failed to procure the names
he had promised, but delivered the note to the plaintiff. The note
was made payable to the order of the plaintiff. The second
paragraph of the answer averred the same facts, and was sworn
to. The court below sustained a demurrer to both paragraphs.
This is here assigned as error.
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The appellants insist that the ruling in the case of Pepper v.
The State, 22 Ind. 399, requires that the decision of the court
below in this case should be reversed. We will consider the case
cited only so far as may be necessary to determine its effect upon
the question now before us. That case holds that, in an action
upon an official bond given to the state, the sureties may defend,
either upon the ground that the names of persons appearing to be
signed to such bond were forged, and that they executed the bond
upon the faith that such signatures were genuine; or that they
were induced to execute and deliver the bond to the principal
obligor upon the condition, or upon the consideration, or upon the
promise, that certain other persons would sign it.. It is, however,
expressly said by the judge who delivered the opinion, in overruling the petition for a rehearing, that "we do not say that the
same rule that applies to bonds taken pursuant to a statute would
apply in private transactions." We are not disposed to extend
the effect of that decision to instruments negotiable either by
statute or by the law merchant, unless required to do so upon
authority or principle. And as the case.cited is put rather upon
authority than principle, we will consider how far the decisions
require us to extend the ruling. Indeed, the opinion given upon
overruling the petition for a rehearing rests, except so far as it is
based upon the construction of the statqte, which construction we
are not called upon to review, upon the case of Bibb v. Beid et
al., 3 Ala. 88, which, it is stated in the opinion, "is directly in
point, and, after much .reflection, we are prepared to say is, in our
judgment, good law." That case cites.the law as stated thus, in
Sheppard's Touchstone 59: "So it must be delivered to a
stranger; for if I seal my deed and deliver it to the party himself, as an escrow, upon certain conditions, &c., in this case, let
the form of words be what it will, the delivery is absolute, and
the deed shall take effect as his deed presently, and (in reference
to the legal operation of the deed) he is not bound to perform the
condition."
The opinion proceeds: "The rule as above stated in the Touchstone, has been recognised in the United States, in the cases cited
from 5 Cranch 851, 8 Mass. 230, and 2 Sumner 487; but it does
not appear to obtain at this day in England, as appears by the
case of tJohnson et al. v. Baker, 4 Barn. & Ald. 440, where a
composition-deed was delivered by a surety who - had signed the
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deed, to a creditor, not to be operative unless all the other
creditors executed it. It wds held that the deed was delivered
as an escrow, and that all the creditors not having executed it, the
surety was not bound. To the same effect are the cases cited
from 3 Wend. 380, 11 Verm. 448, 4 Cranch 219, 2 Harrington
396, 11 Peters 86." The court seem evidently to have misconceived the effect of the decision in the case of Johnson et al. v.
Baker. The creditors were all parties to the deed of composition, and when the debtor alone had executed it, "the deed was
then delivered to one of the creditors, in order that he might get
it executed by the rest of the creditors." It does not very clearly
appear that because an instrument, after being executed by one
party, may be delivered to -another party to be executed by him,
and presented by him to others who are parties to the deed, for
their execution, and still not become a deed till executed by all
parties, that therefore a deed, perfect in form and execution, may
be delivered by the grantor to the grantee as an escrow. Nor is
the citation of the ruling in -Pawlinget al. v. United States, 4
Cranch, as conflicting with the later case of Moss v. Biddle, 5
Cranch, satisfactory, especially as the later case is in conflict
with the doctrine asserted by the Alabama court. But we will
examine that case more carefully in the course of this opinion,
only remarking in passing, that whatever the case in 4 Cranch
does decide, which we will endeavor to determine in the subsequent review of the case, it certainly does not hold that a delivery
may be made by the obligor of the bond to the obligee, as an
escrow. Nor does the case of The United States v. -effler, 11
Peters, examined hereafter, establish any such doctrine. The
case in 3 Wend. 380, was where a bond had been executed by
nine persons as obligors, "and sent to New York to be delivered
to the plaintiff, on certain terms and conditions, by which the
obligors intended to be indemnified for having become bound for
the payment of the money. Theplaintiffs refused to receive the
bond on the terms and conditions proposed. Subsequently, on the
29th of October 1824, five of the obligors, but not those sued in
the action, without the knowledge or consent of the defendants in
this action, having made a new and different arrangement with
.the plaintiffs, by which the security relied on by the defendants
for their indemnity was yielded up, delivered the bond to the
plaintiffs." It *as held that the bond was not obligatory upon
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the four who never entered into the new arrangement with the
plaintiffs. The bond was dated September 21st 1824, and the
plaintiffs had then notice of the terms upon which the delivery
was authorized; they refused to receive it upon those terms, but,
on the 29th October, made other terms with five of the parties to
the bond. The 'plaintiffs knew the terms on which the delivery
was authorized, and refused to accept upon those terms, and the
case simply decides that where the extent of the agent's authority
is known to the person who deals with him, the principal cannot
be bound outside of that authority. The case is good law, but
not specially relevant to the text.
The case cited from 11 -Vorm. was where the .names of seven
sureties apjeared upon the face of the bond, and only two of the
sureties ever executed the same. The instrument was plainly
incomplete until executed by all those whose names appeared as
parties.
The decision in .ferdman -v. Bratten, 2 Harrington, 8upra,
was that the deed could not be delivered to the party as an escrow.
This is an express denial of the doctrine it is cited to sustain.
So also the case of The State v. Crisman. et al., 2 Ind. 126,

decides that "a bond cannot be delivered as an escrow to the
obligee."
In the case of The MAfadison, c., -PlankRoad Co. v. Stevens,
10 Ind. 1, Mr. Justice PI KINS states the decision thus: "One
co-obligor may, perhaps, deliver a bond -to another co-obligor
as an escrow, but an instrument cannot he jo delivered to the
obligee or payee, or the agent of either. Such delivery is in
law absolute: Peters' U. S. Digest, tit. Escrow; -Foleyv. Cowgill,
5 Blackf. 18; Yhe State v. O7trisman, 2 nd. .126; Wright v.
The Shelby, &a., Company, 16 B. Mon. 5 ; see 7 Ind. 600 ; 6 Id.
183 ; 9 Id. 25. And parol evidence cannot be given to vary the
legal effect of such delivery, or the terms of the instrument
delivered. This has been-too often decided-to require a citation
of authorities to evidence it: Hiatt et al. v. Simpson, 8 Ind.
256."
The case of Foley v. 0owgill was for a failure to deliver hogs
at a certain time and place, according to a written agreement.
The defendant answered that the agreement mentioned "was
delivered to the plaintiff as an escrow, setting out the contingency
on which it was to become binding on the -defendant, which, it is
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The Court ruled that if the
averred, had never happened."
instrument "be delivered to the obligee on such contingency, the
condition is a nullity, and the delivery absolute."
And yet, without attempting to overrule or question these
cases in our own state, the court, in overruling the petition for a
rehearing, rests the decision of the case of Pepperv. The State,
supra, except so far as a construction is given to the statute,
upon an Alabama case in direct conflict with these repeated rulings of our own court. If the doctrine upon which the Alabama
case proceeds be the law, that a deed or other written instrument
may be delivered to the grantee or obligee as an escrow, it of
course follows that a surety may make such a delivery to his principal. But, in our opinion, such a position is not only without
support, but is in conflict with all authority. In the case of
Worrall v. Munn, 1 Seld. 229, the instrument, an agreement to
execute a conveyance, was delivered conditionally to the agent
of the party to whom the deed was afterward to be executed.
The court declares that the law puts the question at rest; that
the delivery to the agent was a delivery to his principal.
"This was a delivery as an escrow; such a delivery can
only be made to a stranger. It cannot be made to the
party. If made to the party, no matter what may be the
form of the words, the delivery is absolute:" Ward v.
Lewis, .A4ick. 518; Fairbanks v. Metcalf, 8 Mass. 280. Mr.
Parsons says: "A note, as well as a deed, may be delivered as
an escrow, and the law of escrow is substantially the same in both
cases. * * A note cannot be delivered directly to the
promissee, to be held by him as an escrow:" 1 Notes & Bills,
51; Badcock v. Steadman, 1 Root (Conn.) R. 87.
We will examine the cases cited in the original opinion in the
case of Pepper.v. 'The State, stpra. Pawling et al. v. The
United States, supra, was an action "upon an official bond given
by Ballinger, as collector-of the revenue, and signed and sealed
by Pawling, Todd, Adair, and Kennedy, as his sureties, who
pleaded that they delivered the same as an escrow, to one Joseph
Ballinger, to be safely kept, &c., upon condition that if Simon
Ingleman and William Patton, named on the face of the bond,
should execute the same as co-sureties, then the bond should be
delivered to James Morrison, supervisor, on behalf of the United
States, as their deed, and not otherwise ; and that the same.never
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was executed by Ingleman and Patton." Here the representative of the government had notice, on the face of the instrument,
that the same was not complete, not having been executed by all
the parties whose names appeared upon its face as co-obligors.
To have held this delivery of the instrument obligatory upon the
parties, when the writing itself proved the execution to be incomplete,. would have been in contradiction of its express terms.
In The United States v. Leffler, 11 Peters, supra, the question
under consideration is not discussed either by court or counsel,
and the statement of facts does not disclose whether there had
ever been any intentional delivery of the bond, or, if delivered,
by whom such delivery was made; and the only question considered was as to the competency of witnesses to prove a conditional execution. Under what circumstances such a defence was
admitted does not appear. If the names of o.ther parties appeared
on the face of the bond, such a defence would have been
admissible under the Tuling in Pawlingv. The United States,
supra. As no question was made by counsel, it was probably
controlled by that decision. If it were otherwise, the validity of
such a defence was not so clearly established upon authority, that
we are authorized to suppose it would have passed unquestioned
when presented in the Supreme Court of the United States for
the first time.
The case cited from 3 Borr (Penn.) 808, was where a 1 arty, in
executing a bond, expressly stipulated that it shouly not be
delivered up until twelve names were obtained, and the persons
who were procuring names to the bond, for the benefit of third
parties, agreed that they would not deliver it until it was so executed. It was held that such bond was in their hands as an
escrow, and until the condition was performed it could not be
delivered. So in the case cited from 2 Leigh 157, where the
deputy marshal procured a party to sign a forthcoming bond,
taken upon execution, and agreed not to file the bond in court
until other persons had signed it, it was held that he could not
make a valid delivery until the condition was performed. And
again, in 2 Johns. R. 248, it was held that a sheriff might deliver
a deed to an attorney to be held as an escrow, and only delivered
to his client on compliance with the condition. The case of Sharp
v. The United States, 4 Watts 21, decided that a bond containing in its body two names as sureties, was not binding on one who
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signed it, unless it was shown that he dispensed with the execution of it by the other. The case in 7 Pick. 91 ruled that
",where a bond is signed and sealed, but not delivered to* the
obligee, and it is afterward put into the possession of the obligee
by a person who has no authority to deliver it, the obligee cannot
maintain an action on the instrument."
In the case cited from 7 Ohio 875, the court permitted the.
party receiving the deed to testify that he only received it for the
purpose of enabling him to convey to a third party. That the
purpose and consideration of the deed was to enable him, as agent
of the grantor, to execute a conveyance to another. We are
unable to find the case cited, or any case in 4 Johns. R. having
even as remote relation to the subject under consideration as those
we have commented upon. In 34 New Hamp. 460, the rule is
stated that "if a deed is placed in the hands of a depositary, to
be delivered to the grantee upon the death of the grantor, provided it is not previously recalled, but the grantor reserves the
right and power of recall at any time, it is not a good delivery."
In 13 Pick. 75, the presumption arising from the fact of a deed
having been registered is discussed.
The case cited from 1 Johnson's Cases decides that "where
the grantor held the deed until the consideration should be paid,
and died before payment, there was no delivery."
The remaining authorities cited in Pepper.v. The State, supra,
refer to the question of agency, the decision proceeding, so far as
those authorities are relevant, upon the ground that the obligor in
a bond is the agent of the obligee, and the obligee is therefore
responsible for all his representations to his sureties. It is unnecessary for us to examine these authorities, as the appellant in
this case does not assume the position that a person may, as principal, make a valid contract with himself as agent. As a quotation is made from a note by Judge REDFIELD, in the April No.
1868, of the American Law Register, p. 346, which rests upon
the case of Pawling v. The United States, supra, we will cite
the opinion of the same author in the May No. 1864, of the same
magazine, p. 402: "It seems to us upon principle, that where
there is nothing upon the face of the paper indicating that other
co-sureties were expected to become parties to the instrument, and
no fact is brought to the knowledge of the obligee, before he
accepts the instrument, calculated to put him on his guard in
VoL. XIV.-35

-
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regard to that point, and which would naturally have led a prudent man, interested in the opposite direction, to have made
inquiry before accepting the security, the fault cannot be said to
rest, to any extent, upon the obligee. And, on the other hand,
where the surety intrusts the bond to the principal obligor, in
perfect form, with his own name attached as surety, and nothing
upon the paper to indicate that any others are expected to sign
the instrument in order to give it full validity against all the
parties, he makes such principal his agent to deliver the same to
the obligee, because such is the natural and ordinary course of
conducting such transactions; and if the principal, under such
circumstances, gives any assurances to the surety, in regard to
procuring other co-sureties, or performing any other condition
before he delivers the bond, and which he fails to perform, the
surety giving confidence to such assurances must stand the
hazard of their performance, and cannot implicate the obligee in
any responsibilityin the matter, unless he is guilty of fraud or
rashness in accepting the security."
In the note to the April number of the magazine referred to,
some authorities are cited as sustaining the application of the
doctrine laid down in Pepper v. The State to 1 promissory notes
and other contracts not negotiable, or to negotiable contracts
before negotiation." The case cited, Lloyd v. Ioward, I Eng.
Law & Eq. Rep. 227, was where " A., being the payee and
holder of a bill of. exchange, wrote his name upon it and gave it
to B. for the purpose of getting it discounted. B. never paid A.
any money in respect to the bill, but kept it until it was overdue,
when he delivered it to C. without receiving any value for it.
Held, that there was no indorsement by A. to B." The fact that
C. received the bill when overdue, could give him no right o
insist that the apparent indorsement by A. to B. should be treated
as real. The decision in the case of Palmer v. Richards,Id.
529, was where "1the drawer of a bill of exchange which had
been accepted, wrote his name across the back of the bill, and
delivered it to A. to get discounted, who, instead thereof, while
the bill was running, deposited it with B. as security for money
advanced to himself, without fraud on the part of B. Held, that
this was a valid indorsement of the bill by the drawer to B." In
the case of Leaf v. Gibbs, 4 Carr. & P. 466, the facts show that
the plaintiff, who was the payee of the note, knew that when the
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defendant signed as surety, the agreement was that his mother
was also to sign the note with him, and that she afterwards
refused, and the confidential clerk of the plaintiff stated to the
agent of the defendant and his mother that the arrangement was,
in consequence of such refusal, incomplete. The court held that
the defendant was not liable unless he waived the execution of
the note by his mother. Where the payee receives the instrument with full knowledge of its incomplete condition, in fact it
would, it seems to us, be a fraud to permit him to take advantage
of its apparently perfect condition. The decision in the case of
Awde v. Dixon, 5 Law & Eq. 512, also cited, cannot be reconciled with the American decisions. Mr. Parsons refers to that
case as in conflict with the settled law in this country: 1 Bills &
Notes 111. The court, to sustain their ruling, declare it to be
the law. in England, that if one signs a negotiable instrument in
blank, and delivers it, with authority to fill it up for £100, and
it is filled up for £200 and negotiated, the maker will not be
liable. Lord MANSFIELD did not thus state the law in Bussell v.
Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514, and in this country such a doctrine is
against all authority, and a decision resting upon it cannot be
considered in our courts as affording any aid in the determination of legal questions: Fullerton v. Sturges, 4 Ohio State Rep.
529, 1 Parsons, supra, and authorities cited. The decision in
Awde v. Dixon proceeds upon the ground that the writing of the
greater sum in the instrument would constitute the crime of
forgery, and ALDERSON, B., placed the decision in the case upon
that ground. This is perhaps correct under the English statute,
but the Supreme Court of Masachusetts, in Putnamv. Sullivan.
4 Mass. 45, held otherwise, on-the ground that the ins trument
had been delivered upon a trust, intending that something should
afterward be written, to which the name should apply as an
indorsement.

Judge

REDFIELD,

however, seems to have regarded the English

decision in the case of Swan v. North British, &c., Co., 10 Jur.
N. S. 102, as conflicting with the view expressed in the note we
have quoted from. In that case, "1where A. was induced by his
broker to send him blank forms of transfer, which the broker
filled up with numbers and descriptions of shares different from
those of the company intended by A., being shares in the defend
ant's company, and by means of a duplicate key, which he had
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procured to be made without the knowledge of A., obtained
certificates from a box of A.'s necessary to perfect the transfers,
and also forged the names of the attesting witnesses. Held, in
an action against the company for damages, and for a mandamus
to restore the plaintiff's name to the registry, that the acts of the
plaintiff were not such as estopped him from showing that the
deed of transfer was a forgery." In other words, that where the
act of the plaintiff, in trusting the agent with the blank forms of
transfer, did not enable the agent to commit a fraud upon a third
party, but such fraud could only have been consummated by the
addition of larceny and forgery, in such case the plaintiff was
not estopped. We admit that we are unable to understand what
decision a court could legitimately render in such a case having
any relation to the question now under consideration.
There has also been a case decided by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, 5 Humphrey 133, which rests for support upon the
cases We have already examined in 4 Cranch and 11 Peters's
Reports, and in our opinion is not sustained by those authorities.
Counsel have cited to us also the case of The State v. Bodley, 7
Blackf. 355. There were in that case no questions decided or
discussed by the court involving any point now under consideration. Nor could such questions have been presented in that case,
as the bond, when delivered, contained the name, in the body of
the instrument, of the other party who was to execute it, and the
clerk who was to receive the bond had actual notice of its imperfect execution, he being the witness called to prove the fact that
the sureties signed on condition that the person whose name was
with theirs in the body of the bond should also execute it.
Since the decision in the case of Pepper v. The State, the
New York Court of Appeals has rendered a decision, holding
that where a bond is executed by sureties, and delivered to one
of their number to keep until also executed by another surety,
that the instrument, until so executed, is held as an escrow: The
People v. Bostwic, 32 N. Y. Rep. 445.
Blackstone defines a delivery as an escrow, to be a delivery
"to a third person to hold till some conditions be performed on
the part of the grantee." See also 4 Kent 454; 1 Coke 36 a.
In Greenleaf's Cruise on Real Property, book 4, p. 29, it is said
" The delivery of a deed may be either absolute, that is, to the
grantee himself, or to some person for him, or else conditional,
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that is, to a third person, to keep it till something isdone by the
grantee; in which last case it is not delivered as a deed, but as
an escrow." The instrument is as perfect and complete in form
when delivered as an escrow as though it were to be delivered
absolutdly. An instrument delivered as an escrow cannot be
withdrawn, but remains in the hands of the holder, to be delivered over to the party for whose benefit it was executed,
whenever he performs the conditions upon which the original
delivery was made. But so long as the instrument remains in
the hands of one of the parties it has no force whatever.
When a decision is based upon so total a disregard of the
essentials constituting the delivery of an instrument as an escrow,
it may be well to look closely to the authorities which are cited
to sustain this line of ruling.
Those authorities are the ones we have already reviewed, with
the additional one of The State Bank v. -Evans, 3 Green (N. J.)
155, which was a case " where the defendant's name was on the
bond as one of the sureties, and he proved that the bond was
brought to him by one of his co-sureties, and that when he signed
it he delivered it to his co-surety, and said to him, ' Now, this
bond is not to be delivered up until all the persons named in it
have signed it.'" The court held that the testimony was admissible, and that it overcame the presumption of any legal delivery
arising from the mere fact of the obligee having possession of the
bond. This is simply another case where the instrument disclosed upon its face that it had not been executed by all the
parties. But while citing authorities which, as we have seen,
do not sustain the position they are quoted to support, the case
of The People v. Bostwick entirely oyerlooks a decision rendered
a year earlier by the Supreme Court of Maine, in which it was
held that "where a surety to a bond signs upon the assurance
that the principal will procure two other persons, specified and
known to such surety, to sign the bond before he delivers the
same, which he fails to do, but this is wholly unknown to the
obligee at the time he accepts the bond, such surety is bound to
perform the obligation."
The case of Carr et al. v. Jfoore, 2 Ind. 602, was an action
of "debt on a bond given to a school commissioner, signed by
A., C., and P. As to P. the bond was a forgery. The bond
was delivered to C., the principal, to be signed and sealed, and
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it was re-delivered to the commissioner by A. and C., perfected.
The commissioner was ignorant of the forgery, the name of P.
having been placed upon the bond after its delivery to C. for the
signatures. Held, that A. was liable on the bond." Mr. Jus.
tice PERKINS, who delivered the opinion, says: "Had Carr (the
principal) induced Athon (the surety) by fraud to execute the
bond, still the school commissioner, being ignorant of the fact,
could not, we suppose, be affected by it." There was no proof,
however, of such fraud, and the expression must therefore be
taken, we suppose, rather as the judgment of the writer of the
opinion, than as the ruling of the court. But it is certainly
entitled to consideration and respect.
The case of Millett v. Parkeret al., 2 Met. (Ky.) 608, reviews
the authorities very fully upon this question, and holds that "a
conditional delivery to the principal, by a person who subscribes
a paper as a surety, will not make such paper a mere escrow.
The delivery of the paper, to constitute it an escrow, must be
made to a third person, and not to a co-obligor; and this whether
the instrument be assignable or not."
The case of The State v. Chrisman et al., 2 Ind. 126, was an
action of debt upon an administrator's bond. Nelson, one of the
defendant , filed the following plea, verified by oath: "That the
said supposed writing obligatory in the declaration mentioned,
was signed by him upon condition that twelve or fifteen other
good men signed it, which was not done; and that unless said
number of persons did sign it, it was not to be considered his
deed." A demurrer was sustained to the answer. The court
say: "This plea admits the signature to the bond, and does not
deny that the same was delivered to the obligee. When so signed
and delivered it became absolute." Upon the face of the bond
it appears that the name of Nelson was written next following
that of the principal, and was followed by the names of six other
sureties. The presumption in law is that the names were signed
in the order in which they appear upon the instrument, and as
the obligee was the state, and the delivery was the filing of the
completed instrument with the clerk, no delivery could have been
made by Nelson to the obligee, upon his signing it. So that the
decision of the case results, that no delivery by any of his coobligors could be made to the obligee of the instrument as an
escrow, but the delivery by any of them rendered Nelson liable
on the bond.
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It was also held, in the case of Taylor J- Co v. Craig, 2 J. J.
Marshall 449, that a conditional delivery of a promissory note,
by a surety in the note to his principal, did not make the instrumcnt an escrow, but that the plaintiff had the right to hold the
surety responsible without regard to the condition he had imposed
upon the principal at the time of the delivery. The Bank of the
Commonwealth v. Curry, 2 Dana 143, recognises this as the law.
Again, in the case of Smith v. Moberly, 10 B. Mon. 266, in deciding a similar question, this language is used: "But a delivery of
a writing of this character, under such circumstances, to the principal, does not. have the effect of characterizing it as a mere
escrow; but, on the contrary, the principal should be considered as
the agent of the surety, and empowered by him to pass the writing
to the person to whom it may be 'made payable, and his delivery as
being sufficient to make it effectual, unless the payee had notice
of the special terms upon which it was signed. The implied
discretionary authority to use the note, arising out of its possession by the principal, uncontradicted by its terms, or anything
apparent on its face, cannot be restricted by any agreement
between the payors themselves of which the payee had no notice."
The Supreme Court of Vermont have also "held that where a
note payable to a bank was signed by a principal and one surety,
with an agreement on the part of the principal with such surety,
that he would procure another surety, which was not done, before
he procured the note to be discounted, it will constitute no defence,
unless the officers of the bank were cognisant of such agreement:"
Passumpsic Bank v. Goss, 81 Vt. 815 ; Dixon v. Dixon, 3
Vt. 450.
It seems clear, on principle, that a surety cannot make a delivery
of a bond to his principal as an escrow, upon condition that other
names shall be procured before its delivery to the obligee. The
very definition of an escrow involves the holding of the instrument, complete in form, signed and sealed, prepared for delivery
to the obligee, by a third person, who acts as the agent of the
obligors and obligee, and who is to make the delivery, not upon
some act done by the obligors, but upon the performance of some
condition by the obligee. There are but two parties to the
instrument, and so long as it is held by the principal it cannot
be said to be delivered for any purpose, for it remains still in
the hands of the one party, who is only to be bound in any man-
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ner upon its delivery to the other. And where there is no
delivery of the instrument by the one party executing it, it cannot be said to be held as an escrow.
Can a delivery then be made to the principal, as the agent of
his sureties, for any other purpose than an unconditional delivery
to the obligee ?
The interest of the principal is clearly to procure the acceptance of his bond by the obligee, at the earliest moment, and with
the least number of sureties. Experience proves, and the law so
regards it, that it is a hardship to procure bail, and the interest
of the principal is to avoid this hardship. On the other hand,
the interest of the sureties is as clear to avoid a delivery until
their pro rata liability has been reduced by the execution of the
bond by other co-sureties.
It is a well-established principle of law, that he who has an
interest in the doing of a particular act cannot accept an agency
in the same matter for others whose interests are adverse to his
own. A person will not be permitted to assume an agency for
others where the interests of his principal would be in direct
conflict with his personal interests. In Copeland v. Jercantile
Ins. Co., 6 Pick. 198, MoRToN, J., says: 1 It is a rule of law well
settled, and founded in the clearest principles of justice and sound
policy, that the agent of the seller cannot become the purchaser,
or the agent of the purchaser." Judge STORY, in his work on
Agency, § 211, says: 1 For the like reason (that is, for the same
reason that forbids an agent of the seller himself to become the
buyer), an agent of the seller cannot become an agent of the
And again, § 9: 1 Yet we are
buyer in the same transaction."
to understand that they cannot, at the same time, take upon themselves incompatible duties and characters. * * A memorandum made and signed by a seller, at the request of the purchaser,
will not bind." See 3 Parsons on Contracts, p. 11; Smith's
Mercantile Law 149; Wright v. Daninah, 2 Camp. 203; Farebrotherv. Simmons, 5 B. & A. 333 ; Rayner v. Linthorne, 2 C.
& P. 124; Cooper v. Smith, 15 East. 103. In The Utica Ins.
Co. v. Toledo Ins. Co., 17 Barb. 132, it is said: "1The general
principle that a party cannot act for himself in the same transaction in which he undertakes to act for another is well settled,
and the validity of a contract in which he acts, and to which he
is a party as agent for a third person, and also in his own behalf,
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does not depend upon the question whether he makes an advan.
tage by the transaction. * * The character of agent for one
party to a contract, and that of principal upon the other part,
are incompatible :"
pparte Bennett, 10 Yes. 381; Florence
v. Adams, 2 Rob. 556; Beal v. MAKinnan, 6 Louis. 407; Bent
ley v. Columbia Ins. Co., 19 Barb. 595.
The law, indeed, makes the principal, for a special purpose,
i. e., the delivery of the instrument, the agent of his sureties
Their delivery of the instrument to the principal, after placing
their names upon it, authorizes the principal to make the delivery
to the obligee, for such is the channel through which the paper
would properly pass in reaching the obligee. And the delivery
of the instrument to be by him at once transferred to the obligee,
is a delivery entirely consistent with the interests and inclination of the principal, and for such a purpose the delivery is pro.
per. The original contract is between the principal on the bond
and the obligee. The compliance with the contract is the delivery of the bond by the principal obligor to the obligee, duly
executed by himself and his sureties. The contract between the
principal on the bond and his sureties is that they will enable
him to comply with his original contract. For this purpose they
sign and deliver to him the instrument, that in the fulfilment of
his original contract he may deliver it to the obligee.
T
ow, is it not clear that as the general purpose of the delivery
by the sureties to the principal is that he may make a delivery
to the obligee, no conditions imposed upon such delivery will bind
the obligee unless they are known to him? In the case of PickN

ering v. Bu8k, 15 East 38, Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J., states
the law thus: "Strangers can only look to the acts of the parties,
and to the external indicia of property, and not to the private
communications which may pass between a principal and his
broker; and if a person authorize another to assume the apparent
right of disposing of property in the ordinary course of trade, it
must be presumed that the apparent authority is the real authority. I cannot subscribe to the doctrine that a broker's engagements are necessarily, and in all cases, limited to his actual
authority, the reality of which is afterward to be tried by the
fact. It is clear that he may bind his principalwithin the limits
of the authoritywith which he has been apparentlyclothed by the
principal in respect to the subject-matter; and there would be
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no safety in mercantile transactions if he could not. If the principal send his commodity to a place where it is the ordinary busi
ness of the person to who~m it is confided to sell, it must be
intended that the commodity was sent thither for the purpose of
sale. If the owner of a horse send it to a repository of sale, can
it be implied that he sent it thither for any other purpose than
that of sale ? Or if one send goods to an auction room, can it
be supposed that he sent them thither merely for safe custody ?"
And where the surety signs and delivers the bond to the principal, from whom it would naturally pass to the obligee, are we to
suppose that such delivery to the principal was merely for safe
custody ? The rule laid down in the case cited is, where the
commodity is sent in such a way, and to such a place, as to exhibit
an apparent purpose of sale, the principal will be bound, and the
purchaser safe. "BAYLEY, J.-If
the servant of a horse-dealer,
with express directions not to warrant, do warrant, the master is
bound; because the servant, having a general authority to sell,
is in a condition to warrant, and the master has not notified to
the world that the general authority is circumscribed." And is
not the surety upon a bond, who delivers it to his principal in
apparent proper condition to be delivered by him to the obligee,
and with the general authority to make such delivery, but circumscribed by a condition, unknown to the obligee, bound by the
delivery which the principal may make in disregard of the condition ? The rule is stated by a learned author thus: "An agent's
authority is that which is given by the declared terms of his
appointment, notwithstanding secret instructions; or that with
which he is clothed by the character in which he is held out to
the world, although not within the words of his commission.
Whatever is done under an authority thus manifested, is actually
within the authority, and the pfincipal is bound for that reason;
for he is bound equally by the authority which he actually gives,
and by that which, by his own acts, he appears to give. * *
The appearance of the authority is one thing, and for that the
principal is responsible:" 1 Pars. on Cont. 44. The surety
places the instrument, perfect upon its face, in the hands of the
proper person to pass it to the obligee, and the law justly holds
that the apparent authority with which the surety has clothed
him shall be regarded as the real authority, and as the condition
imposed upon the delivery was unknown to the obligee, therefore
the benefit of such condition shall not avail the surety.
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Thus, in our opinion, should the rule be established upon principle ; and, as it appears by the examination we have made, that
the authorities relied upon to sustain a contrary rule are, in the
main, irrelevant, and are in turn quoted to support the cited
decisions which are really in point, we are inclined, after a review
of all the cases, to regard the real weight of well-considered decisions as sustaining the rule which to us seems to rest also upon a
correct principle.
So far as the decision of the case of Pepperv. The State, supra.
rests upon the construction of the statute, and upon the fact of
forgery, we are not called upon to review it.
The action of the court below upon the demurrer was correct.
The judgment in this case is affirmed, with one-eighth
of 1 per cent. damages, and costs.

United States Provisional Uourtfor the State of Louisiana.
UNION BANK OF LOUISIANA v. THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
AND THE FIRST NANIONAL BANK OF NEW ORLEANS.
On the occupation of New Orleans and the neighboring parts of the state by the
Federal forces, in April, 1862, the officers of the rebel state government fled from
Baton Rouge, the capital, to other parts of the state still held by the rebels, claiming to carry the government with them. The auditor of the state carried with him
the public bonds belonging to the banks, deposited with him, according to law, as
security for their circulation. These securities were held by him without warrant
of law, as against any one claiming through the Federal government.
Securities, so withheld within the lines of the enemy, are lost, within the meaning of the law authorizing a recovery on instruments lost, without producing them.
Money, whether principal or interest, coming due on such securities, is due to the
actual legal owner of them, and not to the person who wrongfully holds them.
Coupons are negotiable evidences of debts for interest, and are, in substance,
promissory notes, payable at a specified time. If taken by any person, after they
are due, they are taken subject to all the equities which properly ttach to them in
the hands of the previous holder.
A recovery may be had by the owner for the interest due on bon. without producing the original coupons, on its being shown that they are wrongfully withheld
from him in the territory of an enemy, and are therefore inaccessible to him, and
also that they were so held when they became due, so that no one, hereafter to
appear, can have the rights to them of a bondfide holder, for value, without notice.
Securities so withheld by the rebel state auditor, their locus being shown, are not
lost within the meaning of the article of the Civil Code of Louisiana requiring that
securities lost shall be advertised before a recovery can be had on them.
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THis was a suit, commenced by the Union Bank of Louisiana,
to'recover the sum of $90,000, being the amount of interest due
on five hundred bonds of the consolidated debt of the city of
New Orleans, under the following circumstances:The said bonds, with the coupons attached, were deposited
with the auditor of public accounts, at Baton Rouge, in 1854, by
the plaintiff, to secure the redemption of the circulating notes of
the plaintiff, issued in conformity with the free banking laws of
1853, of the state of Louisiana; to be transferred and returned
by the auditor to plaintiff upon its application, accompanied by
a delivery to him of cancelled circulating notes to an equal
amount or pro rata. On the capture of New Orleans and that
part of the state in 1862, the officers of the insurrectionary
government fled to avoid falling within the Federal lines, first to
Opelousas and then to Shreveport, continuing to exercise their
official functions at the places of their flight; the auditor carried
with him the bonds so deposited. Under a special pass from Gen.
Banks, the plaintiff did, by an agent, deliver cancelled notes to
the amount of $252,600 to the rebel auditor at Shreveport, and
applied for the return of an equal amount of bonds. with their
coupons; the said auditor refused to deliver the same, and was
prohibited by the rebel legislature from doing so. The plaintiff
finding it impossible.to obtain the coupons, then applied to the
mayor of New" Orleans, and to the First National Bank of New
Orleans, the fiscal agent of the city, with which were deposited,
as required by law, certain revenues of the city, dedicated exclusively to the payment of these bonds, to pay the interest due on
them, without the production of the coupons, which was refused
by them, and this suit was thereupon commenced.
On the trial all the above facts were either proved or admitted.
William H. Hunt, for plaintiff.
Ohristian Roselius and Sullivan, Billings & Hughes, for
-defendant, the city of New Orleans..
Miles Taylor, for defendant, the First National Bank of New
Orleans.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PEABODY, J.-The plaintiff was the owner of bonds of the city
of New Orleans to the amount of $500,000. The bonds are not
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yet due. The interest on them was payable semi-annually in
July and January of each year. The principal and interest are
expressly stipulated to be paid on the face of the bonds themselves. There were also separate from the bonds, coupons for
the interest-one for the interest on each bond for each half year.
These coupons are separate, or separable by the holder, from the
bonds, and show, each of them, how much interest is due, and the
particular time at which it is due according to the tenor of the
bond to which it relates. Each bond is payable to bearer, and
each coupon for the interest on it is also payable to bearer.
These bonds and coupons were by plaintiff deposited with the
auditor of the state of Louisiana. He was to hold them as
security for the redemption and payment by plaintiff of certain
bills issued by it. Whenever those bills or notes should be paid
and cancelled, he was to return the bonds and coupons to plaintiff,
and so pro rata when any part should be paid. This deposit was
made under a law of the state under which plaintiff organized
and obtained its corporate powers; and being a matter between
the plaintiff and the bill-holders as parties in interest, it is much
the same as if it had been.done by compact between them.
Two hundred and fifty-two thousand dollars of the bills or notes
of the bank, for which the bonds or coupons were pledged, have
been paid and cancelled..
Those notes have been returned to the person with whom the
bonds and coupons were deposited as auditor, and plaintiff has
demanded and sought to obtain from him the bonds and coupons
held as security for them, but has been and is wholly unable to
recover them by legal process or otherwise. Moreover, the man
with whom, as auditor, they were pledged (Mr. Peralta) has
ceased to be an officer of this state, and has fled beyond the jurisdiction of the authorities thereof, and for all practical purposes,
out of the'state, taking the securities with him.
Both the man and securities are entirely beyond the reach of
plaintiff and beyond all process of courts or of the government
itself.
He is moreover an alien enemy of the United States, and be
and the securities with him are within the lines of the enemy, in
territory held by them .jure belli, and therefore in law as well as
in fact inaccessible to plaintiff, and incapable of being dealt with
by it.
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Money for the payment of the interest due has been deposited
by the city, the debtor, with the defendant, "The First National
Bank," the legal fiscal agent of the city, and is held by it foi
that purpose, and for that purpose alone. That interest the bank
is willing to pay if the coupons are produced, but it refuses to
pay it until they are produced, on the ground that it is authorized
to pay only on the surrender of the coupons, and that the coupons
being outstanding may hereafter appear in the hands of some one
who can compel paynent from one or the other of the defendants

to him.
Plaintiff claims to recover the interest due; he claims to do
this without producing the coupons, on the ground that they are
placed beyond his power to produce by the unwarranted action
of the recreant trustee, being detained by him wrongfully within
0
the enemy's lines.
The claim is, that as plaintiff is the actual owner of the securi-'
ties (bonds and coupons), it has a right to be paid what is due on
them, and that as they were both in the hands of Mr. Peralta
after the interest sought to be recovered, and the coupons for it
had become due, and no one had any right to them then, no one
can now have, or can hereafter acquire a title to them which will
enable him to recover on them after payment made to plaintiff.
Of the matters discussed on the trial, many of them at very
great length, these are all that are material to the case, in the
view I have taken, and most of them were substantially conceded,
and nearly all the rest are very easily deduced from the evidence.
On these facts one question arises: Are the coupons for the
interest, which plaintiff claims to recover, shown to be so situated
that no one hereafter to appear can have the right to them of a
bond fide holder for value without notice ? If they are, plaintiff
must recover; if they are not, it is not so easy to say how he can
recover.
If they are so situated, at any rate there is no difficulty in
deciding that he may recover. The mere fact that they are in the
territory of the enemy of the United States, with which no legal
intercourse can be had, in the hands of an alien enemy there, is
quite sufficient to warrant a recovery without the production of
them in a proper case, and whether the holder is an auditor or
not an auditor, or whatever he is, "q uocunque nomine gaudet,"
and whether in law they may be deemed lost or not lost, it is
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plain that they are within the familiar principle of law, applicable
to securities lost or wrongfully withheld, and which authorizes a
recovery without the production of them.
It is equally clear that if their locu8 there is shown, they are
not lost within the rule of the Code-one of evidence merely-that
before a recovery can be had on securities as lost, they must be
advertised, &c. They are there, and they are beyond the power
of the plaintiff, without his fault, and that is all that is necessary
to warrant a recovery without the production of them in a case
proper in other respects.
The bonds and not the coupons are the basis of the right to
recover, the coupons being each a mere memorandum of the
interest due from time to time on each bond, and of the time when
such amonnt by the terms of the bond becomes due. The bonds
are not intended to be surrendered when the interest is paid, but
the coupons, if within the power of the owner, are ordinarily
surrendered when the sums due on them are paid; and in this
manner the coupons in the hands of the debtor become vouchers
of the fact of payment, as they had previously, in the hands of
the creditor, been evidence of the debt, and also that the amount
stated wws due, not to the holder of the bond (unless the same
person hdd both bond and coupon), but to the holder of the
coupon itoclf. In this manner they are made to answer probably
three purpbues; they make each separate half year's'interest on
each bond tegotiable by itself, separately from the rest of the
bond, and owiwer the purposes of evidence in the hands of the
creditor and of the debtor in turn, as above stated, in the one evidonce of debt and in the other evidence of payment.
The bonds claimed to the amount of $252,000 and the coupons
attached, beyond all question, are the property of plaintiff, and
are relieved from 4ll right of possession in the present custodian,
and so indeed, I think I may add, are all the rest of the half
million in his hands.
He is a mere wrongdoer as to all, and has no right to any part
of them; I think, even if he were in law and in fact the buditor
of the state, it would make no difference. A fugitive from the
state and the securities with him, he would have no right to
retain them I think as against the bank, in his flight and away
from his post of duty. It would be abundantly easier to hold.
that he might rightfully withhold them, a fugitive in the land of
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the Dey of Algiers, that distinguished potentate being at peace
with this country, than to hold that he had a right out of the territory held by this government, and within the territory of an
enemy where no citizen of this country could have access, to
retain them there.
But he is not auditor of the state in law or in fact, and would
have no right to retain them anywhere-not even in the state,
and at a proper place for an auditor to be at for the performance
of his duties as- such officer; and under the circumstances he
surely has no right at all to hold them, or any of them.
But the question recurs, and it is the only one remaining to be
considered: Are the coupons shown to be so situated that no one
else can now have or hereafter acquire a title to them, which
shall enable him to maintain an action on them? For it is not
doubted that they are in their nature negotiable, like promissory
notes, and a person who takes them before due for value, without
notice of a defence in the hands of a previous holder, takes them
discharged from all defences which might exist against them in
the hands of any party tlfrough whom he derives title.
The plaintiff, in his petition, alleges that they (the coupons in
question, at any rate to the amount of sixty thousand dollars),
remained in the hands of Mr. Peralta until after the time at which
they became due.
He says: "The coupons for the interest due on the 1st July,
1862, the 1st of January and the 1st of July, 1863, and the 1st
of January, 1864, amounting to sixty thousand dollars, were in
the possession of the auditor (Mr. Peralta), at Baton Rouge, after
the same matured and became due."
The answer of the city takes issue on this, in a very general
way, by denying in general terms the allegations of the petition
not therein specially admitted. It suggests no alteration in their
position, and, indeed, makes no allusion to this allegation of the
petition at all, but is content with a general sweeping denial of
all, not expressly admitted in the answer, more or less. This,
however, is sufficient to change the burden of proof, and throws
it on the plaintiff.
The answer of the city takes issue in a different manner, and
denies pointedly and specifically whatever of the plaintiff's allegations it seeks to put at issue. After treating several other allegations of the petition, it answers to the allegation above stated,
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in substance, that the coupons to the amount of $60,000 remained
and were in possession of the auditor after they became due, not
by denying that they were so, but by denying that they were in
his hands at the time they became due "or are so now," that is,
at the time the answer was made. It says: "It (meaning the
city) denies that the coupons which matured on the 1st day of
July 1862, or the 1st day of January 1863, or the 1st day of
July 1863, or the 1st day of January 1864, or any other coupons,
the property of the Union Bank, were in the possession of said
auditor at the time of their maturity, or now are." -This is not a
denial that they have ever been so since they became due, and
nothing less than that will put the very material averment of the
plaintiff in that respect in issue.
The evidence in the case seems to sustain the allegation of the
petition. Very slight evidence would be sufficient for the purpose in the existing condition of the case.
The First National Bank does in a formal manner deny it, and
as to it evidence would be necessary if it were in a condition to
make such an issue. But it is at least doubtful if the First National Bank has an interest that permits it to make such an issue.
That institution, as the fiscal agent of the city, and the depository
agreed on between the plaintiff, the owner of these securities, and
the city the debtor, is but a trustee for the benefit of the city and
the plaintiff, and the parties in interest being both paities to this
suit, and bound by the judgment herein, it is at least doubtful,
whether the bank, their trustee, should be heard to make an objection which neither of the parties in interest deigns to interpose.
It is not material to the bank to whom it pays. In the disbursements of moneys belonging to the city it would perhaps incur no
responsibility, except to the city, and the city being a party to
this suit, will take care of its own interests and will be bound by
the decision herein. It is not certain, however, and I will not
assume that the bank would not, under any circumstances, be
liable to the holders of the coupons in question, if any should be
able to establish a right to recover on them. The bank will be
protected beyond all doubt by the 'udgment herein as against the
plaintiff and its co-defendant, the city of New Orleans.
How stands the case on the evidence ?
First. They are shown to have been deposited, as above stated,
with Mr. Peralta, then auditor, and there is no proof or allegation
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that they have gone from his possession into that of any one else,
and I am not aware that any presumption of such a change arises
in the absence of proof and allegations to that effect. It is true
that they should have gone from him to his successor in office,
Mr. Torry, and, perhaps, that should be presumed in the absence
of evidence; but that gentleman was called as a witness, and
testified that they did not so come, and any such presumption is'
sufficiently negatived; and when it is recollected that the same
Mr. Peralta still claims to be auditor of the-state, and is exercising (although in his own wrong) the functions of that office at
Shreveport or elsewhere, the omission to transfer to Mr. Torry, as
his successor, the books, papers, and property of the office is
accounted for, and the presumption that they still remain with
him (Mr. Peralta) is not a little strengthened. Add to this the
fact that he could not legally or without crime transfer or dispose
of them to any one else, and that presumption becomes stronger
still.
Moreover, this Mr. Peralta, although no officer, and having none
of the rights of one, is nevertheless claiming to be so, and condacting himself as such; and although, as I have said, he has no
right to these securities, and in withholding them is acting without warrant of law, still the fact is that he professes and attempts
to play that character, and actually believes that he is doing so..
and perhaps that he has the right so to do; and these securities
in his hands are perhaps no more likely to be diverted by his
criminal act to purposes wholly foreign to those for which they
were deposited, or fraudulently sold or put in circulation in violatiou of duty, real or fancied, and of honesty and good morals,
than they would be if he were actually and de jure auditor of the
state, as he claims to be and to act, and as he no doubt is and has
long been de frcto of that large portion of the state held in
occupation by the enemy; no more likely to be criminally converted to private purposes by him now than they were when held
by the same persoa when he was (as all concede he was at one
fime) actual ana -bont fide auditor of the state de jure as well as

de facto.
When the plaintiff upplied to Mr. Peralts for these securities,
by its agent, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Peralta claiming to act as auditor,
received the cancelled notes and was about to deliver to him bonds
to a correspondiag amount, but was dissuaded from doing so, and
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was finally overruled in his determination ; and admitting that he
still retained them, and that they belonged to plaintiff, and ought
to go to him, yielded to adverse influence and refused to let
plaintiff have them. He did not pretend that he did not still
hold them, but on the contrary admitted the reverse, and wished
to restore them to plaintiff by delivering them to Mr. Gordon.
But, aside from all evidence introduced as such at the trial, the
conduct of this person, claiming to be auditor of this state under
the rebel government in reference to these public securities, in
the case of the plaintiff and those of several other public institutions similarly situated, has become almost matter of public or
historical information, and we are all of us informed in the premises. And while with the strict non-intercourse maintained with
the enemy, and all within his lines, by reason of the war, it is
difficult to procure testimony from witnesses having personal
knowledge on the subject, still intelligence on the subject, as
reliable as can ordinarily be had in such a case, is possessed and
by everybody fully relied on, that these securities are retained
by the person claiming to be auditor, exactly as if he were really
auditor, and by him kept out of circulation or use in any manner;
and no one I believe doubts the fact. Mr. Peralta is in no just
legal sense a public officer in our estimati6n, although he assumes
to act as such, and is performing the role of auditor. If he were
in law, as he and those associated with him claim he is-and we
all know that he is defacto, as to a large part of the state, a
public officer-auditor of public accounts, the evidence would
seem different; but as it is, it seems to carry conviction to the
minds of alL On the trial no real doubt seemed to be entertained
by any one what in point of fact was the actual condition of these
securities, and it was almost assumed. If the securities had gone
out of the possession of Mr. Peralta into the hands of a bond fide
holder, or in-such manner that they were liable to get there before
they became due, that fact would be vital to the defence and fatal
to the plaintiff; and yet, if I recollect correctly, nothing of the
kind was intimated; nothing of the kind was alleged in the proceedings or shown, or attempted to be shown in evidence, or
claimed or suggested on the argument of the case. They were
abundantly shown to have been placed there, and the evidence
that they had not been removed or taken away was as good and
convincing as proof of a negative often is.

